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Abstract
We study cross-country GDP losses due to financial crises in terms of frequency
(number of loss events per period) and severity (loss per occurrence). We perform
the Loss Distribution Approach (LDA) to estimate a multi-country aggregate GDP
loss probability density function and the percentiles associated to extreme events
due to financial crises.
We find that output losses arising from financial crises are strongly heteroge-
neous and that currency crises lead to smaller output losses than debt and banking
crises.
Extreme global financial crises episodes, occurring with a one percent probability
every five years, lead to losses between 2.95% and 4.54% of world GDP.
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1 Introduction
Financial crises have played a quintessential role after the collapse of the Bretton Woods
system of fixed exchange rates. Episodes like the Latin American debt crises in the 80’s,
the 1987 Black Monday, the 1992-1993 ERM crisis, the 1994-1995 Tequila crisis, the
1997-1998 South East Asian meltdown, the 1998-1999 Brazilian and Russian crisis, the
2000-2001 Turkish crisis, the 2001 Argentine crisis and the 2007-2009 global financial
crisis all resemble disaster events, just like hurricanes or earthquakes.
Like catastrophic events, financial crises can be characterized by frequency and severity.
In fact, analysis made in the financial crises literature often refers to terms such as
frequency and severity (see Bordo et.al., 2001). The insurance and operational risk theory
and practice offer toolkits to analyze frequency and severity of losses as well as aggregate
losses due to catastrophic or operational risk events. Given that the losses to country
economies from financial crises (in terms of GDP drop or forgone GDP) are similar
to catastrophic losses, we can apply the loss distribution approach (LDA) familiar in
the actuarial literature to analyze frequency and severity of losses and thus study rare
events and their probabilities (see Panjer, 2006; Shevchenko, 2011). To the best of our
knowledge, there is no attempt to quantify the frequency and severity of financial crises
using the LDA.
The advantage of the LDA is that we can analyze frequency of events and severity in
a separate fashion and then combine them to obtain a global loss probability density
function. In the study of GDP losses arising from financial crisis, it is of interest to study
frequency and severity on their own as shown in Bordo et.al. (2001).
The LDA allows us to estimate a multi-country aggregate GDP loss distribution and thus
estimate conditional losses in the event of a financial crisis occurring in the near future.
We can also determine the probability of rare economic disasters as defined for example
in Barro (2006). In contrast to Barro (2006) however, we do not make any assumptions
on the channel through which crises occur (e.g. catastrophic events like earthquakes or
regular/cyclical disaster events).
In terms of methodology, we use the financial crises database of Laeven and Valencia
(2008) to date financial crises across 170 countries from 1970 onwards. The number
of such events over a predetermined period is called the frequency of events. We then
estimate output losses per financial crises event with a number of methods. Afterwards,
we aggregate country output losses across events over the period. Since a particular crisis
event can generate output losses over various years, we set the span of analysis to be five
years. Finally, we compound frequency and severity to generate a loss probability density
of aggregate losses that allows us to report standard risk measures.
We find that output losses after financial crises are strongly heterogeneous and a large
number of countries never recovered their pre-crises growth rates or trends. Also, we show
that currency crises lead to smaller output losses than debt and banking crises, while the
largest losses are found after debt crises. The presence of a debt crisis also exacerbates
any of the other two forms of crises, while the presence of a currency crisis in the wake of
a debt or banking crisis diminishes output losses through faster recovery. Banking and
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debt crises alone are found to be more severe than twin crises consisting of banking and
currency crises or debt and currency crises.
The LDA approach leads us to conclude that mean worldwide costs of financial crises
within periods of 5 years are in the range of 0.52% to 0.81% of 2005 world GDP. Extreme
crises episodes, occurring with a one percent probability, can lead to losses between 2.95%
and 4.45% of world GDP.
The analysis of losses produced in the paper can be a useful tool in discussions about
the existence of insurance against the risk of financial crises at the aggregate level. For
example, Caballero (2003) proposes such an arrangement for emerging market economies.
In what follows, we will provide a short literature review and discuss the possibilities at
hand to calculate output costs of financial crises. In section 3, we introduce the method-
ology of crisis identification and loss calculation, while the Loss Distribution Approach is
explained in Section 4. Results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 discusses a potential
form of international insurance and Section 7 concludes.
2 The costs of financial crises
In order to quantify the costs of financial crises, we need to define a metric. Studies on
this subject use a varied set of cost measures. Costs have been estimated as fiscal costs,
costs to the stock market, and output costs. Among studies analyzing the same kinds
of losses, methodologies also differ. In addition, one of the main obstacles to measuring
losses caused by financial crises is how to identify losses only due to financial crisis and
not arising from other contemporaneous factors.
2.1 Fiscal costs, costs to the stock market and output losses
In an attempt to quantify the costs of banking crises to the economy, Hoggarth et.al.
(2002) consider direct resolution costs as well as broader welfare costs to the economy,
approximated by output losses. They argue that resolution costs are a rather limited
proxy for costs incurred through banking crises, as they may reflect a transfer of income
from taxpayers to banks rather than costs imposed to the economy as a whole. The
authors reason that there could be a positive correlation between fiscal costs and output
losses if crises are systemic. On the other hand, if fiscal costs are a good proxy for effective
crisis resolution, higher spending on crisis resolution should lead to lower output losses
during a crisis period. No clear statistical relationship between fiscal costs and length
of crises is found, while output losses and the length of crises do depict a clear positive
correlation.
Frydl (1999) presents a comparative analysis of prior banking crises studies. As one of
the reasons for the non-significant statistical relation between resolution costs and crises
length, he claims that resolution costs usually measure fiscal costs of banking crises,
which are often subject to various errors and do not incorporate many indirect costs
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to the government or the economy. Having dismissed fiscal costs as a reliable indicator
for crisis severity, Boyd et.al. (2000), use the discounted value of corporate returns to
measure the impact of crises. Under the condition that corporate profits represent a
relatively constant fraction of total output, a decline in the real values of stock prices
at the onset of a crisis in percentage terms is approximately equal to the decline in the
present discounted value of total output.
With regards to the impact and depth of currency crises, possible measures to be con-
sidered (in addition to output losses) are the loss of international reserves and the de-
preciation of the real exchange rate (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). However, the most
popular method is to proxy costs to the economy with GDP losses, given that economic
growth is a natural final performance indicator. This is the approach we follow in this
paper.
We identify two strains of literature approximating real GDP losses due to financial
crises. The first uses a dummy variable approach to estimate growth losses over samples
of countries, studies like Demirguc-Kunt et.al. (2006), Gupta et.al. (2007), Hanna and
Huang (2002) and Barro (2001) follow this path. The second approach proxies welfare
losses by comparing GDP during a crisis period with some estimate of potential output.
Hoggarth et.al. (2002) is one representative study of this latter approach. It estimates
potential output assuming that output would have grown at the same constant rate based
on its past performance. Various studies, such as Bordo et.al. (2001), Aziz et.al. (2000),
Frydl (1999), Boyd et.al. (2000, 2002) and Cecchetti et.al. (2009) calculate output losses
from banking crises in a similar fashion, even though their trend estimates are based on
differing pre-crises windows, methods, definitions about onsets, ends and durations of
crisis episodes.
A main criticism of the dummy variable approach is that it can only identify average
magnitudes of growth contractions associated with crises for all countries. It therefore
does not seem to be well suited for highly heterogeneous losses. Output costs calculated
through cross-section or panel data regressions are usually found to be lower than losses
calculated based on output gap estimations.
In a comparative analysis, Angkinand (2008) suggests that the output gap approach is
more appropriate than the dummy variable approach in capturing the output costs of
crises. This is so because the individual output costs across crises vary substantially.
Our loss estimation methodology therefore follows the output gap approach.
2.2 Output gap calculations
Determining the length of a crisis
The literature does not offer a unanimously agreed method to date the beginning of finan-
cial crises. Banking crisis start dates are usually defined through a mixture of quantitative
and qualitative criteria. Caprio et.al. (1996) rely on the assessment of finance profession-
als. Including and expanding on this approach, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998)
compile five studies of banking crises’ starting dates. Other studies identifying banking
4
crises’ dates are Dziobek et.al. (2008), Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), and Lindgren
et.al. (1996).
The onset of a currency crisis is generally defined as a situation whereby a sufficiently
large depreciation of the domestic currency occurs1, often accompanied by a loss in inter-
national reserves, while a debt crisis takes place in the event of a country defaulting or
renegotiating all or parts of its private debt. The most recent financial crises compilation,
widely used in previous empirical studies, stems from Laeven and Valencia (2008) and
comprises banking, currency, and debt crises over the period 1970 to 2008.
To date the end of a crisis episode, one possibility is to define the end date based on
“expert” opinions or on the “consensus” view from various studies. An alternative is
to define the end of a crisis endogenously once a country returns to a certain pre-crisis
growth rate or recovers its potential output growth path.
Studies determining the end of a crisis based on the recovery of the average growth rate of
a pre-crisis window are, among others, Bordo et.al. (2001) and Aziz et.al. (2000). Authors
such as Boyd et.al. (2002) argue that summing up deviations from an estimated trend
up to the point at which the observed growth rate returns to its pre-crisis average is
problematic since output typically remains well below its pre-crisis absolute output trend
once the growth rate has recovered.
Cecchetti et.al. (2009) avoid calculating a counterfactual and define the end of a crisis as
the point in time when real GDP has reached its absolute pre-crisis level. This method
is problematic in at least two ways. First, the method does not take opportunity costs
of foregone output growth into account. Second, the method implies that a crisis is
only counted as such if output growth actually turns negative during the crisis year.
It can be argued, however, that a financial crisis has negative effects without having
caused an actual recession, e.g. through a transitory or permanent slowdown in growth.
Moreover, since potential growth rates vary across countries, dating the end of a recession
by reaching its pre-crisis level of real GDP can lead to an underestimation of total losses
incurred.
Estimation of a counterfactual
To be able to measure output losses during crisis periods according to the methods
described above, it is necessary to compare actual output with its trend level. There is a
handful of approaches to estimate trend GDP levels. They differ mainly by the pre-crisis
time window chosen, which in turn depends on the assumption about financial crises
either following economic booms or a slowdown in economic activity.
Hoggarth et.al. (2002) assume that output would have grown at a constant rate based on
past growth performance and extrapolate linear three and ten-year trends, while Bordo
et.al. (2001) use five-year pre-crisis trends. Instead, Frydl (1999) apply ten year pre-crisis
periods and Boyd et.al. (2000) extrapolate linear pre-crisis growth trends.
A large part of the heterogeneity in the magnitude of output losses in the study of crises
stems from the calculation of trend output. Studies like Kindleberger (1978), Borio et.al.
1Sometimes an additional criterion of increased speed of depreciation as compared to some prior time
window is introduced.
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(1994) and Logan (2001) find that banking crises follow economic booms. In this case, a
trend estimated over a short period prior to a crisis would overestimate potential output
and lead to an overestimation of crisis length and depth. On the other hand, studies
like Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) or Gorton (1988) find that banking crises are often
preceded by a slowdown of economic activity, in which case losses would be understated.
If one assumes that pre-crisis growth deviates (in either direction) from the long-term
potential output growth path, one option is to increase the pre-crisis trend calculation
period in order to capture mostly “normal” years. An alternative is to exclude a certain
period prior to the onset of a crisis. Last, the Hodrick-Prescot (HP) filter can be applied
to diminish the influence of booms or recessions on the potential growth path. While
Aziz et.al. (2000) base potential output on the average output of the three years prior to
crises, Bordo et.al. (2001) use five-year pre-crisis growth rates and Hoggarth et.al. (2002)
calculate potential output trends based on ten-, three-, and one-year pre-crises growth
rates; for a comparative study see Angkinand (2008).
Once we establish the counterfactual, we can estimate total output losses by adding up
the difference between actual and potential output over the duration of the respective
crisis.
Even though the general concept is agreed upon across the studies mentioned above,
several methodological issues remain debated. Identification of crises accompanied by
output losses varies among studies. While some authors include a crisis if output is below
its trend or if output growth is negative during the crisis year, other studies include crises
even though output is above its trend in the crisis year, given that output is below trend in
the subsequent year (Angkinand, 2008). Further issues arise in the case of multiple crises
per country within short periods of time. In the case that output has not yet recovered
from one crisis at the point of outbreak of a following crisis, some studies choose to sum
losses of subsequent crises and report a single loss, while others divide losses across crises
or simply choose to exclude countries with multiple crises during the sample period.
2.3 Identification of causality
To assess the direction of causality between economic growth and banking crises, Hog-
garth et.al. (2002) compare a sample of 29 countries experiencing banking crises with
neighboring countries which did not face banking crises at the same time. The hypothe-
sis is that “the movement in output relative to trend during the crisis period would have
been, in the absence of a banking crisis, the same or similar to the movement in the
pairing country” (Hoggarth et.al., 2002). Their analysis hints at the point that output
losses are in most cases caused by banking crises and come as unforeseen events.
Bordo et.al. (2001) find, across all countries and crisis periods considered, that recessions
with crises are more severe than recessions without them. These results are in line with
various studies such as Frydl (1999).
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3 Methodology
3.1 Crisis identification
We use the financial crises dataset of Laeven and Valencia (2008). Currency crises,
banking crises, and debt crises are identified over the period 1970 to 2008. Laeven
and Valencia (2008) identify banking crises on the basis of a number of quantitative
and subjective criteria, such as a large number of defaults and a high quantity of non-
performing loans. The starting year of a currency crisis is identified by building on an
approach developed in Frankel and Rose (1996). Sovereign debt crises are reported in the
case of sovereign defaults to private lending as well as in a year of debt rescheduling. The
number of currency crises peaked during the early 1980’s and the early 1990’s with around
30 currency crises per year, while banking crises have in general been less frequent and
peaked during the early nineties. The number of debt crises per year has been decreasing
since the mid-1980’s and debt crises have nearly ceased to exist until recently, see Bicaba
et.al. (2011).
We identify the starting date of a financial crisis as the year of outbreak of any one of
the three types of crises. Real GDP data is taken from the World Economic Outlook
database and spans the time period from 1960 to 2010.
To calculate output losses caused by crises, the first step is to define whether a crisis has
an impact on the economy. In the case where output is compared to a counterfactual, we
identify a crisis if output in the crisis year is below its trend level (trend output estimations
are discussed below). In an alternative calculation of crisis losses, no counterfactual is
established and a crisis accompanied by output losses is considered as such if output
growth is negative during the crisis year.
For countries with multiple crises during the sample period it is possible that a crisis
occurs before the economy has recovered from a previous crisis. In this case, we assign
subsequent losses to the later crisis date, establishing a new counterfactual. This method
is problematic, though other alternatives suffer from larger errors. Allocating output
losses from subsequent crises to the first crisis would largely overstate output losses in
various cases.
3.2 Output losses
We estimate three kinds of potential output trends and propose several cutoff points to
determine the end of a crisis. In short, there is no perfect method to estimate an ob-
jective output trend. Every method presented shows both advantages and disadvantages
depending on the assumptions about the mechanics of financial crises.
Following the literature, we estimate potential GDP after the onset of a crisis in three
ways. We estimate an HP trend, where potential output during a crisis episode is based on
the average HP growth rate of the ten and three year pre-crisis periods. In addition, we use
average growth rates from three year and ten year pre-crisis time windows. We compare
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the losses against trend output levels to absolute losses (for episodes with negative growth)
without considering opportunity costs. In total we have thirteen possible ways to measure
output losses as well as their severity and frequency.
Output losses are calculated as the difference between actual real GDP and its trend level.
A graphical example is given in Figure 1, depicting output during the Ecuadorian banking
crisis, which shows that losses depend not only on the definition of the counterfactual
but largely on establishing an end-point of a crisis.
According to the time output needs to recover its pre-crisis level, the effects of the crisis
lasted two years and led to an output loss of 10% of GDP. If crisis length is calculated
until real GDP growth reached its pre-crisis growth rate, output losses occurred over a
period of two and three years and led to output losses of 10.1% and 22.4% of GDP,
calculated against a three and ten-year pre-crisis growth trend respectively.
Figure 1: Ecuador 1998
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, this calculation most likely still does not account for the
total output loss caused by the 1998 Ecuadorian banking crisis. The period of output
loss increases to six and seven years, and output losses accumulate to 38.1% and 51.4%
of GDP respectively if losses are estimated until the level of real GDP recovers its three
and ten-year pre-crisis trend. As illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, output losses seem to
be underestimated if crisis recovery is defined as being completed at the point where the
pre-crisis growth rate or the pre-crisis level of real GDP are recovered.
As mentioned above, we estimate losses using various trends and various cut-off points
to determine the end of a crisis. In total, 13 loss estimations are presented.
We distinguish three definitions of recovery from a crisis. According to the first definition,
a crisis ends once real output has reached the level of its counterfactual. The alternative
is that recovery is completed once the average pre-crisis growth rate is resumed. As
some countries never recover according to these definitions, accumulated losses against
the counterfactuals based on linear three and ten year trends, based on simple averages
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Figure 2: Ecuador 1998
of pre-crises growth, are considered over maximum periods of five and ten years, while
the losses against trends based on the HP filter are allowed to accumulate over periods
of maximum ten years. Note that an alternative potential remedy that we do not pursue
here in cases where we have an infinite sum of losses is to perform present-value GDP
losses by discounting future losses appropriately. In the absence of a counterfactual, a
crisis is supposed to be ended once output reaches its absolute pre-crisis level of real GDP.
4 The Loss Distribution Approach
The estimated output losses across countries obtained in the previous section allow us to
study the frequency and severity of losses. In the analysis of a financial crisis hitting the
world economy, two usual questions appear: a) what is the frequency of financial crisis?
and b) given a financial crisis, how severe is it? The frequency of financial crises is the
number of such events over a specific period of time. Since a financial crisis duration
spans generally more than a year, we choose a five-year reference period. The severity of
a financial crisis is the amount of output loss incurred in each crisis episode.
Given the frequency and severity of losses occurring within 5-year periods, we can use the
LDA common in the insurance and operational risks literature. Chernobai et.al. (2011)
and Cruz (2004) provide detailed descriptions of the workings of the LDA. We estimate
two possible parametric distribution functions commonly used to describe the frequency
of events nt over a period of time t. We also estimate a set of six severity probability
density functions2 for events zt,i. As opposed to the standard one year period, our t
represents periods of 5 years. This is because GDP losses due to financial crises consider
losses over more than one year. The index i tracks each event within the period of analysis
t.
2The set is composed of the gamma, exponential, generalized extreme value, generalized pareto, log
normal and weibull density functions.
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During a 5-year period, global losses are given by the sum of each loss event i across
countries in the sample.
St =
nt∑
i=1
zt,i (1)
The random variable nt takes discrete values while the variables zt,i are non-negative
(positive losses), real valued quantities. The aggregated loss S depends on the realization
of the discrete random variable (n) and the continuous random variable (zi). Therefore,
the aggregation S is itself a random variable whose distribution has to be determined by
convolution methods (Panjer, 2006; Shevchenko, 2011).
Specifically, the frequency of loss events (n) has a probability distribution denoted by
pn = Pr(N = n) while the loss severity z has a density distribution and cumulative
distribution functions denoted by fz and Fz, respectively. According to Panjer (2006),
the cumulative density function of S is defined as:
F (S) = Pr(ω ≤ S)
=
∑∞
n=0 pnPr(ω|N = n)
=
∑∞
n=0 pnF
n
Z (S)
(2)
Where F nZ (S) is the n-fold convolution of the cumulative density function of S. A simple
way to estimate F (s) is via Monte Carlo simulations. First we draw n from pn and then
we draw z from fz as many times as indicated by n. Last, we sum up the z draws.
5 Results
In total, we observe 62 debt crises, 122 banking crises, and 196 currency crises. As
some of these crises in effect form twin crises, we examine a total of 340 crises episodes.
Depending on the method applied, we find between 110 and 219 contractionary crises
episodes. While around 210 contractionary crises episodes are identified against HP
trends, only 110 crises were accompanied by negative growth rates during the crisis year.
Average losses are higher compared to previous studies, this is so because econometric
studies usually estimate losses over a sample comprising recessionary crises as well as
crisis followed by a rebound in GDP, while we only consider crises leading to output
losses (against a trend or absolute). From a total of 196 currency crises in our sample,
between 90 and 120 crises (depending on the calculation method applied) have led to
a loss of output compared to some measure of potential output, while 63 crises were
accompanied by negative output growth. This result is in line with previous studies such
as Gupta et.al. (2007), who find that about 60 percent of currency crises lead to output
contractions while the rest were accompanied by output expansions.
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The analysis that follows concentrates on a benchmark loss classification group that
relies on the HP filter: losses until recovering average 10 year HP filtered GDP growth
rates (HP10perc), the level of a 10 year HP filtered GDP trend (HP10trend), 3 year HP
filtered GDP growth rates (HP3perc), and the level of a 3 year HP filtered GDP trend
(HP3trend).
5.1 The frequency of financial crises
In order to carry out the LDA, we first estimate distribution functions for the frequency
of losses from financial crises. We assume two commonly used distributions such as
the Poisson and the Negative Binomial Distribution. The key parameter in the Poisson
Distribution is λ which is also the mean and variance of the number of losses. This is
the drawback of the Poisson fit, the data in our benchmark case (the four HP trend
counterfactuals) have numbers of crisis events with variances of about sixteen times the
mean.3 Therefore, the two parameter Negative Binomial distribution is a more flexible
way to accommodate our data.
In Figure 3 we depict the estimated distributions for our benchmark loss classification.
The Negative Binomial distribution has a lower mode but allows a more extreme number
of losses relative to the Poisson distribution. The probability that the data come from
the Negative Binomial is higher for all cases (the benchmark and all types of loss classifi-
cations). In all cases, the mean number of crises occurrence over five-year periods ranges
from 20 to 30.
5.2 The severity of financial crises
The average accumulated loss caused by financial crises varies from 9% of real GDP to
15% of real GDP if output losses are accumulated against trends based on HP filtered
data (Table 1). In total, depending on the loss measure applied, 186 to 219 crises episodes
are observed. Average losses are the largest when calculated against a ten year trend and
if losses are considered until the level of trend output has been recovered over a maximum
time span of 10 years.
Median losses lie between 4.9% and 7.15% of initial GDP and the most severe crises
destroy up to three years of economic output.4
As can be seen in Tables 7 through 14 in Appendix B, alternative output losses calculated
are very heterogeneous and large average percentage losses are driven by few especially
severe crises events. Of these most severe events, potential output has not been reached
again within a period of ten years. This result is in line with Furceri et.al. (2011), who
3The number of crisis events for the other loss classifications have a variance to mean ratio of more
than 13, except for the case where opportunity costs are not considered (ABS).
4Crises’ percentage losses are calculated as the sum of the difference between real output observed
and potential output after the onset of a crisis until its end, divided by the real output in the year of
crisis onset. Losses are usually larger if calculated on the basis of other trend estimations as presented
in the appendix.
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Figure 3: Estimated distributions for the frequency of losses
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Note: +++: Negative Binomial, ***: Poisson. Horizontal axis measures the number of financial crisis
in the world over a typical five-year period
find that the growth rate after debt crises eight years after the onset is still suppressed
be nearly 10 percentage points. Amongst the largest losses observed are those of several
Asian countries, namely Indonesia in 1998 and Thailand in 1997, both experiencing severe
losses in the wake of the Asian crisis.
Severity data due to financial crisis have a key feature, it is extreme valued. In figure 4 we
see that the mean-excess-over-threshold plots5 have positive slope at the right extreme of
losses. Figure 4 shows that the long-tailed nature of severity data is generated by specific
types of crises. Currency and twin currency-banking crises produce the more extreme
type of losses.
5The sample mean excess plot is defined by: mep =
∑n
i (Xi−u)I(Xi>u)∑n
i I(Xi>u)
, with u > 0 and I(.) and indicator
function.
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Figure 4: Mean excess over threshold for severity data. Both axes are in log scale of
losses
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We fit the severity data with six possible probability density functions using the maximum
likelihood estimator for the corresponding parameters. The six distributions are Gamma,
Exponential, Generalized Extreme Value (GEV), Generalized Pareto, Log-normal, and
Weibull. Some distributions, like the GEV, fit the right end tail better, while others
have a better fit over the entire range of data. Our benchmark choice is the Weibull
distribution because it maintains a better fit over the entire range of data for all severity
classifications.
Types of financial crises
Consistent with studies like Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), we find that currency crises
lead to smaller output losses than debt and banking crises.6 About 70 of the 122 banking
crises in our sample lead to output losses. We can not conclude that banking and currency
crises are generally preceded by high or low periods of growth as we do not observe a
general dominance of losses calculated against three year pre-crisis trends as opposed to
losses against ten year pre-crisis trends.
6Distributions of these three types of crises’ losses, calculated as losses accrued over a maximum
period of five years until the average growth rate of a ten year pre-crises period is recovered, are depicted
in figure 6, while descriptive statistics of all calculation methods are provided in tables 8 to 14.
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We find that average output losses after debt crises7 are 9% higher than losses after
banking crises. The median debt crisis is accompanied by output losses of 11.7%, three
percentage points larger than the median banking crisis. A large share of debt crises has,
however, been accompanied by banking crises. Of the 62 debt crises in our sample, 36
have led to periods of negative growth. Of these 36 episodes, 26 have been accompanied
by banking crises with mean losses about 30% higher than if debt crises occur alone.
Currency crises8 incur smaller losses than banking or debt crises of 15% in the mean and
5% in the median. This result is in line with Furceri et.al. (2011) that concluded that
debt crises tend to be more detrimental than banking and currency crises.
Figure 5: Severity distributions
Source: Authors’ calculations. For graphical reasons, distributions are cut at 1.5
Banking and debt crises alone are more severe than twin crises consisting of banking and
currency crises or debt and currency crises. While twin crises between banking or debt
and currency crises mostly lead to larger growth reductions in the very short run than
banking or debt crises alone, long term losses are often found to be smaller. A possible
explanation could be that a depreciation in the wake of a twin crisis (including a currency
crisis) allows for a competitiveness gain which is not present when a banking crisis occurs
alone and allows for a faster recovery. Twin crises consisting of debt and banking crises
consequently incur the highest losses in our sample.9
Severity by region
The highest losses after financial crises are experienced in Asia with average losses ranging
723% of initial GDP if recovery of the average HP growth rate ten years before a crisis is considered
(HP10 perc)
8According to HP10 perc
9For detailed descriptive statistics of other loss measures, please see tables 8 to 14.
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from 9.8% to 21.8% of initial GDP.10 The second highest losses are observed in Europe,
followed by Latin America and Africa. The highest frequency of financial crises is, how-
ever, observed in Africa. Europe and Asia are mostly struck by currency and banking
crises, while Africa and Latin America have suffered from all three types of crises to
nearly equal degrees. In a joint analysis, debt crises were observed to be more severe
than currency or banking crises. This result holds for all regions except for Asia, where
banking crises lead to the most severe losses. Since a high share of currency and banking
crises reported are in effect twin crises, it is however difficult to disentangle losses from
both types separately. Furceri et.al. (2011) confirm our results by controlling for the
other types of crises.
Severity by income groups
In order to compare losses across different income groups, we classify countries into low,
middle, and high income categories.11 On average, middle income countries experience
the highest output losses (15%), followed by high and low income countries (12% and
11% of initial GDP respectively, see Table 3). This observation holds for currency and
banking crises, while losses from debt crises are almost exclusively observed in low and
middle income countries.
The median crisis is more severe in high income than middle income countries. High
average losses in middle income countries are driven by some extreme crisis events, such
as Thailand in 1998, experiencing losses of 229%.12 The median loss is 9% for high income
countries, 7% for middle income countries, and 4% for low income countries. In total,
middle income countries suffer more from financial crises than high income countries as
they experience a larger number of crises per country over the period observed.
Severity of financial crises over time
As expected, financial crises were especially harmful during the 1990’s and depict the
lowest losses during the 1970’s and the period after the year 2000. However, this does
not necessarily mean that financial crises have become smaller in magnitude.
The severity of the 2007 financial crisis in the USA
Our main analysis considers a sample ending in 2005. However, we have enough in-
formation to estimate the severity of the 2007 financial crisis in the USA. We date the
US banking crisis to late 2007 even though the main event, Lehman Brothers filing for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, did not take place until September 2008. Output
trends are calculated as before with 2007 being the first year of output gap calculations.
Data are taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook database until 2011. From 2012
until 2016, real GDP forecasts reported in the IMF database are used. Reliable output
losses can therefore only be calculated over an interval of 5 years (2007-2011), larger loss
windows are however reported for comparative reasons.
10Calculated against counterfactuals based on average HP filtered growth rates
11World Bank classification.
12See Figure A-2 in Appendix A.
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Figure A-5 in Appendix A shows real GDP for the USA from 1995 until 2016. Average
real GDP growth in the ten years prior the financial crisis was 3.2 percent and 3.1 percent
in the last three years before 2007. Real GDP growth slowed down to less than 2 percent
in 2007 and finally turned negative during 2008 and 2009.
If the costs from the financial crisis are to be considered until the pre-crisis level of real
GDP has been reached again and opportunity costs are ignored, the endpoint of the crisis
is found to be in 2011 and costs remain modest at 5 percent of 2007 real GDP.
Turning towards our baseline calculations, calculated against a linear trend based on a
pre-crisis time window of a HP filtered real GDP series, costs become larger and range
between 15 and 48 percent of initial GDP if a 5 year time is considered and between 15
and 107 percent if costs are allowed to accumulate for up to ten years. The windows vary
from a three year period, if the crisis is considered to be overcome once the pre-crisis
average growth rate is recovered, to ten years in the case of defining the end of a crisis
as recovery of the pre-crisis growth trend.
Baseline results over 5 year windows of around 30 percent of GDP are consistent with
costs calculated in e.g. Chinn and Frieden (2011), who estimate costs of the 2011 financial
crisis at 3.5 trillion USD, which is roughly 26 percent of 2007 real GDP.
Historically, the 2007 financial crisis ranks among the most severe crises episodes. A
comparable percentage loss of real GDP during the last 40 years has only been experienced
by some Asian countries in the wake of the 1998 Asian crisis.
5.3 The distribution of total losses
Given our choice of the frequency distribution and the severity probability density func-
tion, we perform Monte Carlo simulations to obtain a numerical probability density func-
tion (PDF) of total losses over five years. These PDFs are markedly skewed to the right.
Table 5 summarizes the results. The 99.9 percentile of the total loss distribution ranges
from 2.4 to 3.6 trillion of 2005 USD. Estimates of cumulative world GDP loss due to the
2008-2009 world financial crisis are 5 trillion (IMF, 2009). This means that the recent
financial crisis losses occur with very low probability. For the USA, Chinn and Frieden
(2011) estimate a cumulative GDP loss for the USA to be about 3.5 trillions in 2005
USD.
6 Risk-sharing against financial crises
Can output losses from financial crises be diminished or crises prevented ex ante through
an insurance scheme against rollover risk or capital flight? As financial crises are relatively
rare events, one could imagine countries paying a certain amount of premium during
financially stable times and in return having access to these funds during times of need.
Papers like Caballero (2003) and Cordella and Levy-Yeyati (2005); Cordella and Yey-
ati (2006) have proposed insurance schemes with global scope. The estimation of the
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stochastic properties of financial crisis losses at the global perspective in terms of fre-
quency, severity and their global aggregation is a useful device in thinking about the
proposed insurance schemes.
According to our estimates, the potential worldwide costs from financial crises over peri-
ods of 5 years in percentage terms of 2005 world GDP are presented in Table 6. Average
costs of financial crises during a period a five years are relatively small and amount to
less than one percent of 2005 world GDP. A period of extreme crisis events, occurring
with a one percent probability, produces output costs of up to 4.54% of World GDP. For
example, if there is a will to cover global losses up to the 99 percentile, the amount of
insurance coverage is such percentile minus the median value.
Many of the debt crises included in the above calculations are in fact destabilizing con-
fidence crises or liquidity crises, during which rollover costs of debt become excessively
high, rendering an illiquid country insolvent. In a similar manner, liquidity risk is often
the cause for the occurrence of banking crises. The IMF provides a de facto insurance
(Cordella and Yeyati, 2006, see) for these cases in the form of standard IMF programs.
While the IMF does play the role of lender of last resort, it does so ex-post, after the
country usually has already entered into financial turmoil.
As a type of national insurance against crises, nearly all emerging economies have ac-
cumulated large amounts of international reserves in order to possess a buffer against
pro-cyclical international capital flows. Caballero (2003) argues that hedging the finan-
cial mechanism behind macroeconomic disasters is a problem of a magnitude larger than
a single market can handle.
The moral hazard problem arising through a potential insurance scheme is addressed in
various studies. Cordella and Levy-Yeyati (2005) examines to what degree the presence
of a country insurance scheme affects the policymakers’ incentives to undertake reforms.
An important channel through which insurance can foster reforms can be identified:
Insurance reduces the probability that deteriorating fundamentals evolve into large crises,
which may enhance the expected political reforms and increase reform incentives.
Participation in a potential crisis insurance fund would therefore have to be subject to ex
ante compliance with a number of clearly defined eligibility criteria, such as low budget
deficits and a clear debt to GDP threshold. The potential insurance coverage must be
forfeited as soon as the country does not fulfill all criteria. As stated in Cordella and
Yeyati (2006), it would also be crucial to characterize and standardize the procedures
followed after funds from the insurance facility have been accessed. In the optimal case,
the existence of this insurance would incite fiscal discipline and, at the same time, provide
liquidity if needed which in turn would lead to fewer crises.
Attractiveness of interest rate insurance implies that the insurance premium in tranquil
times is lower than the costs through high rollover costs in turbulent times. In addition,
the countries not experiencing liquidity problems have to be assured a benefit from the
other country not entering into a crisis which exceeds the costs incurred through the
insurance premium. Contrary to regular insurance, risk sharing depends on the contagion
effects of financial crises from the country in financial turmoil to the liquid countries.
Feasibility and benefit analysis is a potentially attractive area for future research.
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7 Conclusion
Through the use of the financial crises database of Laeven and Valencia (2008) to date
financial crises, we characterize the heterogeneity of aggregate output losses. In our LDA
setup, the number of crisis events over a certain period is called the frequency of events,
while the different metrics of GDP losses describe the severity of such losses. We fit
common parametric frequency and severity distributions to compound global GDP loss
densities and to report standard risk measures.
In line with the existing literature, we find that output losses after financial crises are
strongly heterogeneous and a large number of countries never recover their pre-crises
growth rates or trends. Loss distributions are skewed to the right, with average losses
ranging between 9% and 15% of initial GDP.
Currency crises lead to smaller output losses than debt and banking crises, while the
largest losses are found after debt crises. The presence of a debt crisis also exacerbates
any of the other two forms of crises, while the presence of a currency crisis in the wake of
a debt or banking crisis diminishes output losses through faster recovery. Banking and
debt crises alone are found to be more severe than twin crises consisting of banking and
currency crises or debt and currency crises.
We compare output costs from financial crises over world regions, country-income groups,
and time. We find that Asia has suffered from the most severe financial crises, while
Africa experiences the highest frequency of financial crises. Congruently, middle income
countries experience the highest output losses, followed by high and low income coun-
tries. Financial crises are observed to have been especially harmful during the 1990’s,
while a global assessment of the severity of the recent 2008 financial crisis cannot yet be
undertaken with our approach.
The LDA approach leads us to conclude that mean worldwide costs of financial crises
within periods of 5 years are in the range of 0.5% to 0.7% of 2005 world GDP. Extreme
crises episodes, occurring with a probability of one percent, can lead to losses in the range
of 2.95% to 4.54% of world GDP.
There are some aspects that go beyond the scope of this paper. For example, the treat-
ment of the appropriate time span for the LDA planning. We consider a five-year horizon
but this is not necessarily the best from an optimal insurance design perspective. Also,
all the calculations are based on aggregating GDP levels in comparable Dollar units. All
calculations regarding percentage GDP losses are made after the LDA aggregation and
relative to an initial GDP level. There is a possibility of exploring the LDA benchmark
by allowing for the aggregation of percentage GDP losses directly. In this case, suit-
able GDP weights have to be considered. In addition, financial crisis distort long run
growth in a number of cases, if so, losses in terms of GDP per capita instead of GDP
levels can provide an adequate long run picture. Last, our loss approach is unconditional
but the framework can be extended to incorporate conditioning factors in the stochastic
processes that drive frequency and severity of GDP losses. We leave this issues open for
future research.
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Appendix A Figures
Figure A-1: Percentage loss distributions. Currency, debt, and banking crises
Figure A-2: Percentage loss distributions over income groups
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Figure A-3: Percentage loss distributions over regions
Figure A-4: Percentage loss distributions over time
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Figure A-5: Impact of the 2007 financial crisis on US growth
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Appendix B Tables
Table 1: Severity of financial crises (as percentage of initial GDP)
Loss Measure Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
HP10 perc 204 0.14 0.06 0.24 0.0001 2.30
HP10 trend 214 0.15 0.07 0.25 0.0003 2.30
HP3 perc 203 0.09 0.05 0.17 0.0000 2.04
HP3 trend 219 0.10 0.06 0.12 0.0000 1.06
NOTE: Estimation of losses to recover average 10 year HP filtered GDP growth rates (HP10 perc), to
recover the level of a 10 year HP filtered GDP trend (HP10 trend), to recover 3 year HP filtered GDP
growth rates (HP3 perc), and to recover the level of a 3 year HP filtered GDP trend (HP3 trend)
Table 2: Severity of crises by Regions - All crises (Losses as percentage of initial GDP)
Variable Nr. Africa Nr. Europe Nr. Latin A. Nr. Asia Nr. North A.
HP10 perc 79 0.13 22 0.17 39 0.10 39 0.20 1 0.013
HP10 trend 85 0.13 24 0.18 40 0.12 40 0.22 1 0.013
HP3 perc 78 0.07 24 0.10 41 0.12 36 0.10 1 0.008
HP3 trend 86 0.08 24 0.14 45 0.08 39 0.12 1 0.008
NOTE: Estimation of losses to recover a 10 year HP filtered GDP growth (HP10 perc), to recover the
level of the 10 year HP filtered GDP (HP10 trend), to recover a 3 year HP filtered GDP growth (HP3
perc) and to recover the level of the 3 year HP filtered GDP (HP3 trend)
Table 3: Severity by income groups (as percentage of initial GDP)
Variable Nr. High Income Nr. Middle Income Nr. Low Income
HP10 perc 21 0.13 122 0.18 61 0.11
HP10 trend 22 0.16 128 0.17 64 0.12
HP3 perc 22 0.07 120 0.11 61 0.07
HP3 trend 23 0.09 128 0.11 68 0.07
NOTE: Estimation of losses to recover a 10 year HP filtered GDP growth (HP10 perc), to recover the
level of the 10 year HP filtered GDP (HP10 trend), to recover a 3 year HP filtered GDP growth (HP3
perc) and to recover the level of the 3 year HP filtered GDP (HP3 trend)
Table 4: Severity over time - All crises
(as percentage of initial GDP)
Period HP10 perc HP10trend HP3 perc HP3 trend
1970 -75 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.06
1975 -80 0.11 0.14 0.19 0.09
1980 -85 0.18 0.14 0.09 0.10
1985 -90 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.07
1990 -95 0.15 0.16 0.09 0.12
1995 -00 0.19 0.20 0.06 0.07
2000 -05 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.07
NOTE: Estimation of losses to recover a 10 year HP filtered GDP growth (HP10 perc), to recover the
level of the 10 year HP filtered GDP (HP10 trend), to recover a 3 year HP filtered GDP growth (HP3
perc) and to recover the level of the 3 year HP filtered GDP (HP3 trend)
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Table 5: Features of the PDF of total losses.
HP10perc HP10trend HP3perc HP3trend
99.9 percentile 3.0e+012 3.6e+012 2.4e+012 2.7e+012
99 percentile 1.7e+012 2.0e+012 1.3e+012 1.5e+012
median 1.9e+011 2.2e+011 1.4e+011 1.6e+011
mean 3.0e+011 3.6e+011 2.3e+011 2.7e+011
Std deviation 3.7e+011 4.4e+011 2.9e+011 3.3e+011
Notes:
(1) Number of simulations equal to 500 000. In all cases, the frequency distribution
is the Negative Binomial, the severity PDF is a Weibull
(2) Losses are measured in constant 2005 USD and correspond to five-year periods
Table 6: LDA, Losses in constant 2005 USD, over periods of five years, as percentage of
2005 World GDP
HP10perc HP10trend HP3perc HP3trend
99.9% perctl 6.81% 8.18% 5.45% 6.13%
99 % perctl 3.86% 4.54% 2.95% 3.40%
Median 0.43% 0.50% 0.31% 0.36%
Mean 0.68% 0.81% 0.52% 0.61%
Notes:
(1) Number of simulations equal to 500 000. In all cases, the frequency distribution
is the Negative Binomial, the severity pdf is a Weibull, 2005 World GDP from WDI2006
Table 7: Losses after financial crises (as percentage of initial GDP)
Loss Measure Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
AG(10)(5)perc 186 0.3241 0.1632 0.4358 0.0005 2.7310
AG(10)(5)trend 186 0.4257 0.2417 0.5217 0.0005 3.6159
AG(3)(5)perc 182 0.3249 0.1696 0.3997 0.0000 2.0615
AG(3)(5)trend 186 0.4567 0.2776 0.5667 0.0000 4.4838
ABS 110 0.8509 0.1111 2.2077 0.0000 16.0377
AG(10)(10)perc 186 0.5441 0.1632 1.1689 0.0005 8.2695
AG(10)(10)trend 186 1.0587 0.2604 1.9302 0.0005 11.1335
AG(3)(10)perc 180 0.5809 0.1732 1.2679 0.0000 9.2046
AG(3)(10)trend 181 0.9878 0.3403 1.6139 0.0000 9.2046
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Table 8: Losses after currency crises (as percentage of initial GDP)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
AG(10)(5)perc 101 0.2794 0.3949 0.0006 1.8448
AG(10)(5)trend 101 0.3702 0.4870 0.0006 2.2125
AG(3)(5)perc 94 0.2861 0.3658 0.0000 1.7087
AG(3)(5)trend 94 0.3874 0.4260 0.0000 1.7598
HP(10)perc 118 0.1352 0.2825 0.0001 2.2993
HP(10)trend 122 0.1563 0.2947 0.0003 2.2993
HP(3)perc 114 0.0918 0.2111 0.0013 2.0370
HP(3)trend 125 0.0904 0.1293 0.0013 1.0627
ABS 61 0.6811 1.4726 0.0001 7.0657
AG(10)(10)perc 101 0.3674 0.7658 0.0006 6.2588
AG(10)(10)trend 101 0.8587 1.8207 0.0006 11.1335
AG(3)(10)perc 94 0.3635 0.7025 0.0000 5.4637
AG(3)(10)trend 94 0.8509 1.4290 0.0000 8.3445
Table 9: Losses after banking crises (as percentage of initial GDP)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
AG(10)(5)perc 69 0.3650 0.4636 0.0033 2.7310
AG(10)(5)trend 69 0.4834 0.5726 0.0033 3.6159
AG(3)(5)perc 71 0.3321 0.3925 0.0049 2.0615
AG(3)(5)trend 71 0.4793 0.6519 0.0049 4.4838
HP(10)perc 66 0.1424 0.1914 0.0014 1.2766
HP(10)trend 71 0.1547 0.2084 0.0014 1.3075
HP(3)perc 70 0.0800 0.0763 0.0000 0.4705
HP(3)trend 74 0.0958 0.1075 0.0000 0.7574
ABS 35 0.7631 2.1609 0.0000 12.5942
AG(10)(10)perc 69 0.7637 1.5744 0.0033 8.2695
AG(10)(10)trend 69 1.5239 2.4667 0.0033 11.1335
AG(3)(10)perc 69 0.7888 1.7237 0.0049 9.2046
AG(3)(10)trend 70 1.7113 4.7780 0.0049 9.2046
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Table 10: Losses after debt crises (as percentage of initial GDP)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
AG(10)(5)perc 39 0.5002 0.4842 0.0005 1.6946
AG(10)(5)trend 39 0.6244 0.4797 0.0005 1.6946
AG(3)(5)perc 39 0.4282 0.4024 0.0005 1.8020
AG(3)(5)trend 39 0.5248 0.4477 0.0005 1.8020
HP(10)perc 46 0.1723 0.1413 0.0211 0.5531
HP(10)trend 47 0.1966 0.1597 0.0058 0.7095
HP(3)perc 43 0.1224 0.1079 0.0089 0.4846
HP(3)trend 45 0.1395 0.1108 0.0025 0.4846
ABS 36 0.8658 2.7270 0.0026 16.0377
AG(10)(10)perc 39 1.6642 0.8180 0.0005 4.0388
AG(10)(10)trend 39 1.8217 2.8550 0.0005 11.1335
AG(3)(10)perc 39 0.6273 0.9522 0.0005 4.6050
AG(3)(10)trend 39 1.1286 1.4862 0.0005 5.7084
Table 11: Twin crises - Currency and Debt (as percentage of initial GDP)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
AG(10)(5)perc 56 0.3983 0.4209 0.0005 1.8448
AG(10)(5)trend 56 0.5286 0.5121 0.0005 2.2125
AG(3)(5)perc 52 0.3849 0.4200 0.0005 1.8020
AG(3)(5)trend 52 0.5198 0.4797 0.0005 1.8020
HP(10)perc 64 0.1334 0.1223 0.0018 0.5170
HP(10)trend 67 0.1561 0.1520 0.0018 0.7095
HP(3)perc 66 0.1172 0.2541 0.0023 2.0370
HP(3)trend 71 0.1032 0.0998 0.0023 0.4846
ABS 42 0.5397 1.2529 0.0026 7.0657
AG(10)(10)perc 56 0.5708 0.9698 0.0005 6.2588
AG(10)(10)trend 56 1.4029 2.5465 0.0005 11.1335
AG(3)(10)perc 52 0.5311 0.9354 0.0005 5.4637
AG(3)(10)trend 52 1.0760 1.3452 0.0005 4.7534
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Table 12: Twin crises - Currency and Banking (as percentage of initial GDP)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
AG(10)(5)perc 78 0.2716 0.3726 0.0005 1.6946
AG(10)(5)trend 78 0.3435 0.4417 0.0005 1.6946
AG(3)(5)perc 73 0.2965 0.3360 0.0005 1.8020
AG(3)(5)trend 73 0.3900 0.3884 0.0005 1.8020
HP(10)perc 101 0.1531 0.3014 0.0018 2.2993
HP(10)trend 103 0.1716 0.3123 0.0018 2.2993
HP(3)perc 95 0.0822 0.1108 0.0013 0.8544
HP(3)trend 103 0.0960 0.1342 0.0013 1.0627
ABS 56 0.6501 1.3273 0.0001 6.8260
AG(10)(10)perc 78 0.3051 0.4492 0.0005 2.1887
AG(10)(10)trend 78 0.8651 2.1069 0.0005 11.1335
AG(3)(10)perc 73 0.3492 0.5440 0.0005 3.7145
AG(3)(10)trend 73 0.7216 1.1281 0.0005 5.7125
Table 13: Twin crises - Debt and Banking (as percentage of initial GDP)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
AG(10)(5)perc 36 0.5213 0.5045 0.0005 1.6946
AG(10)(5)trend 36 0.6631 0.4996 0.0005 1.6946
AG(3)(5)perc 35 0.4247 0.3862 0.0005 1.8020
AG(3)(5)trend 35 0.5553 0.4129 0.0005 1.8020
HP(10)perc 32 0.2396 0.2447 0.0093 1.2766
HP(10)trend 34 0.2586 0.2595 0.0058 1.3075
HP(3)perc 32 0.1510 0.1293 0.0000 0.4846
HP(3)trend 33 0.1782 0.1590 0.0000 0.7574
ABS 26 1.1814 3.1728 0.0059 16.0377
AG(10)(10)perc 36 0.7952 1.1590 0.0005 5.4650
AG(10)(10)trend 36 1.7638 2.6372 0.0005 11.1335
AG(3)(10)perc 34 0.8204 1.7036 0.0005 9.2046
AG(3)(10)trend 35 1.3295 1.9641 0.0005 9.2046
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Table 14: All Twin Crises (as percentage of initial GDP)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
AG(10)(5)perc 114 0.3173 0.4052 0.0005 1.8448
AG(10)(5)trend 114 0.4238 0.4946 0.0005 2.2125
AG(3)(5)perc 105 0.3344 0.3755 0.0005 1.8020
AG(3)(5)trend 105 0.4527 0.4386 0.0005 1.8020
HP(10)perc 130 0.1588 0.2902 0.0018 2.2993
HP(10)trend 136 0.1759 0.2996 0.0018 2.2993
HP(3)perc 126 0.1068 0.2071 0.0000 2.0370
HP(3)trend 136 0.1078 0.1423 0.0000 1.0627
ABS 78 0.9035 2.2318 0.0001 16.0377
AG(10)(10)perc 114 0.4741 0.9509 0.0005 6.2588
AG(10)(10)trend 114 0.9907 2.0026 0.0005 11.1335
AG(3)(10)perc 104 0.5286 1.1851 0.0005 9.2046
AG(3)(10)trend 105 0.9816 1.5407 0.0005 9.2046
Table 15: Severity of crises by regions - All crises (Losses as percentage of initial GDP)
Variable Nr. Africa Nr. Europe Nr. Latin A. Nr. Asia Nr. North A.
AG(10)(5)perc 71 0.2481 21 0.4674 37 0.2759 32 0.5112 1 0.0091
AG(10)(5)trend 71 0.3253 21 0.6047 37 0.3909 32 0.5751 1 0.0091
AG(3)(5)perc 62 0.2309 26 0.4075 35 0.3083 32 0.5131 1 0.0390
AG(3)(5)trend 62 0.3080 26 0.5250 35 0.4170 32 0.6949 1 0.0390
ABS 43 0.7816 17 1.2325 21 0.3113 14 1.4106 0 0
AG(10)(10)perc 71 0.4279 21 0.5354 37 0.3072 32 1.0558 1 0.0091
AG(10)(10)trend 71 0.9220 21 1.0626 37 0.7603 32 1.8413 1 0.0091
AG(3)(10)perc 60 0.3427 26 0.5793 35 0.3789 32 1.1557 1 0.0390
AG(3)(10)trend 61 0.6376 26 1.2732 35 0.6525 32 1.6113 1 0.0390
Table 16: Average severity of crises by income groups (percentage of initial GDP)
Variable Nr. High Income Nr. Middle Income Nr. Low Income
AG(10)(5)perc 21 0.2844 112 0.3801 53 0.2215
AG(10)(5)trend 21 0.3901 112 0.4945 53 0.2946
AG(3)(5)perc 21 0.2389 113 0.3800 48 0.2327
AG(3)(5)trend 21 0.4923 113 0.4915 48 0.2890
ABS 10 0.4446 71 0.7927 29 1.1332
AG(10)(10)perc 21 0.4032 112 0.6669 53 0.3403
AG(10)(10)trend 21 1.0673 112 1.1918 53 0.7740
AG(3)(10)perc 21 0.4258 112 0.6814 47 0.4106
AG(3)(10)trend 21 1.1015 113 1.0663 47 0.7485
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Table 17: Features of the PDF of total losses (more cases)
ABS AG10.10perc AG10.10trend AG3.10perc AG3.10trend
99.9 percentile 5.7e+012 1.8e+013 3.7e+013 2.2e+013 4.7e+013
99 percentile 2.7e+012 8.7e+012 1.7e+013 1.1e+013 2.2e+013
median 1.8e+011 6.4e+011 1.2e+012 8.1e+011 1.6e+012
mean 3.8e+011 1.3e+012 2.4e+012 1.6e+012 3.1e+012
Std. deviation 6.0e+011 1.9e+012 3.8e+012 2.3e+012 4.8e+012
Notes:
(1) Number of simulations equal to 500 000. In all cases, the frequency distribution
is the Negative Binomial, the severity pdf is a Weibull
(2) Losses are measured in constant 2005 USD and correspond to five-year periods
Table 18: Features of the PDF of total losses (more cases)
AG10.5perc AG10.5trend AG3.5perc AG3.5trend
99.9 percentile 8.8e+012 1.2e+013 1.1e+013 1.5e+013
99 percentile 4.5e+012 6.2e+012 5.4e+012 7.8e+012
median 4.0e+011 5.4e+011 4.9e+011 6.9e+011
mean 7.3e+011 9.8e+011 8.6e+011 1.2e+012
Std. deviation 9.8e+011 1.3e+012 1.2e+012 1.7e+012
Notes:
(1) Number of simulations equal to 500 000. In all cases, the frequency distribution
is the Negative Binomial, the severity pdf is a Weibull
(2) Losses are measured in constant 2005 USD and correspond to five-year periods
Table 19: USA 2007 banking crisis losses (percentage of 2007 real GDP)
Loss measure in Billion USD % of 2007 GDP
HP(10)(10)perc 3009.28 22.78
HP(10)(10)trend 14027.9 106.22
HP(3) (10)perc 2014.14 15.25
HP(3) (10)trend 7415.09 56.14
HP(3) (5) trend 4043.20 30.61
HP(3) (5) perc 2014.14 15.25
HP(10)(5) trend 6329.73 47.92
HP(10)(5) perc 3009.28 22.78
AG(10)(5) perc 5923.15 44.85
AG(10)(5) trend 5923.15 44.85
AG(3) (5) perc 5552.58 42.04
AG(3) (5) trend 5552.58 42.04
AG(10)(10)perc 15334.18 116.11
AG(10)(10)trend 17874.42 135.34
AG(3) (10)perc 9700.10 73.45
AG(3) (10)trend 17851.69 135.17
ABS 666.10 5.04
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